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Over the course of the nineteenth century, the struggles of Paris Bourse to manage counterparty risk
revealed the awkward choices that face derivatives exchanges.  Shortly after it was founded, the stock
exchange, primarily a forward market, instituted a mutual guarantee fund to prevent broker failures
from snowballing into a general liquidity crisis.  The creation of the fund then forced the Bourse to
search for mechanisms to control moral hazard.  To study the determinants of broker failures, we collected
new individual data on defaulting brokers and describe the evolving regulatory regime. To identify
the factors behind the annual number of broker failures we use negative binominal regressions.  To
explain individual brokers’ duration in office, we employ a proportional hazard model, while logit
regressions examine the causes of individual broker failures.   In addition to declines in asset prices
and trading volume, the moral hazard from the mutual guarantee fund contributed to brokers’ defaulting
on their obligations.  The Bourse faced a conundrum; when it finally imposed a tight regulatory regime
that limited risk, trading began to migrate off the exchange to less regulated markets.
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white@economics.rutgers.eduIn the wake of the recent financial crisis, the question that stands center stage is 
how should markets be re-structured to withstand shocks in the future. In this paper, we 
examine how the Paris Bourse, the second most important European exchange of the 
nineteenth century, sought to find the best architecture to manage the failures of its 
broker members that often sparked liquidity crises.  The exchange’s unique character—
primarily a forward market—contrasted its contemporary rivals in London and New 
York.  Consequently, the Bourse was particularly vulnerable to counterparty risk and 
gradually developed institutions and rules that anticipated those deployed by late 
twentieth and early twenty-first century derivatives exchanges.  We identify the basic 
regulatory regimes under which the Bourse operated in the nineteenth century.  From the 
archives of the Bourse, we have collected detailed data on failing brokers that permits us 
to evaluate the individual, regulatory, and macroeconomic factors that were responsible 
for brokers’ failures, and the success of the evolving institutional arrangements.   
From its inception, the Bourse was troubled by the high number of defaulting 
brokers.  Brokers were confronted with the problem of ensuring that customers complete 
their contractual obligations in the forward market, which did not have full legal status 
until 1885.  If there was a large fraud or general shock, enough customers might default 
to endanger the solvency of a broker.  Given that brokers built up balances with each 
other that were only netted on settlement day, one broker’s demise could bring down 
several of his colleagues—the problem of counterparty risk.  When this problem 
overwhelmed the exchange in 1818, the Bourse created a mutual guarantee to insure 
against failures.  To control moral hazard, the exchange sought to monitor and discipline 
its members, creating a unique statistical record of its brokers that rival exchanges of the 
period lack.  However, fine-tuning the financial architecture to manage risk proved to be 
difficult because any reduction of risk-taking on the exchange raised the returns to those 
who could evade the regulation and drove business off the exchange to less formal 
markets.  This development parallels the recent contemporary movement of the trading in 
derivative instruments off of the established exchanges to the largely unregulated 
  3markets.  Lacking exchange-based monitoring, traders have incurred huge losses in these 
markets, which are also alleged to have worsened the financial crisis of 2008.
1 
In this paper, we first describe the basic characteristics of the nineteenth century 
Bourse and provide a detailed description of how the exchange managed defaults, 
ranging from quiet assistance to bankruptcy.  Next, we identify the major regulatory 
regimes.  Our econometric analysis of the annual number of broker failures and 
individual broker defaults reveals that the problem of moral hazard was neither easily nor 
quickly resolved.  Tighter controls imposed in the years after the Crash of 1882 
apparently succeeded; but the Curb then increased its share at the Bourse’s expense.  
When the next financial crisis hit, brokers on the Curb not the Bourse failed, leading the 
government to impose a much tougher regulatory regime on the two markets, with 
trading migrating further away to the unregulated Marché Libre, or free market.   
 
The Paris Bourse in the Nineteenth Century 
 
  The basic elements of the Paris Bourse’s microstructure were set in the early 
nineteenth century.  The Act of March 19, 1802, combined Napoleon’s degree of June 16, 
1802 and the Code de Commerce in 1807 gave the exchange its fundamental character.  
The agents de change or stockbrokers were given a monopoly of trade in government 
securities and other quotable securities, with the rest of the market left to the Coulisse, 
the Curb market.
2 The number of brokers was fixed at 60 in 1816, and it was only raised 
to 70 in 1898.  To buy the office or seat and provide the operating funds for the business, 
capital was raised by establishing partnerships.  The brokers formed a corporation, the 
Compagnie des Agents de Change.  Although the Compagnie was governed by a General 
Assembly, both strategy and management were increasingly delegated to an elected 
                                                 
1 In 2008, the rogue trader Jèrôme Kerviel nearly brought down Société Genéale.  If he had operated on an 
exchange, he would not have been able to hide his positions so easily.  See “Comment la Générale a perdu 
7 millards,” Challenges (Janvier 31 au 6 Février 2008).  Some analysts point to the role of credit default 
swaps in the 2008 panic and argue that they should be traded on an exchange.  For a discussion and 
alternative view see Stulz (2009). 
2 The Bourse and the Coulisse battled over what securities belonged to the brokers’ monopoly up to the 
1885 Cour de Cassation’s judgment that the monopoly only covered the officially listed securities. 
  4Governing Council or Chambre Syndicale, headed by a syndic.  Together, the Chambre 
and the General Assembly set the rules for trading
3. 
  Brokers were pure agents, forbidden to trade on their own account.  Minimum 
commissions were fixed by the Chambre Syndicale and maximum commissions by the 
government.  Although there was an active cash market for securities (marché au 
comptant), most activity centered on the forward market (marché à terme).
4  While the 
forward contracts were not given statutory legality until 1885, this did not usually hamper 
the operation of the market.  In the forward market, buyers and sellers agreed to exchange 
a number of shares at a fixed price on the settlement dates (liquidation), either the 
fifteenth or last day of the month.  Bullish traders would buy contracts in the forward 
market with intention of reselling at a higher price on the settlement date, while the bears 
sold contracts, hoping that prices would decline. No regulations governed margin, which 
was determined by the broker on the basis of the underlying securities and the client’s 
standing (Proudhon, 1857). On settlement day, traders in the forward market decided if 
they wanted to liquidate their positions.  If the current cash price was below the contract 
price, a buyer might not take the securities and could instead renew his position by means 
of a report.  If he had contracted to buy at the end-of-the month, then on that date he 
would buy at the contract price and immediately sell the securities at the clearing price 
(cours de compensation) and enter a new forward contract to repurchase the securities at 
the next settlement date, borrowing funds for this operation.  The syndic set the clearing 
price, which was usually the average quoted cash price on the settlement day.  
  Given the lag in time between the contract and delivery date, brokers were 
exposed to default risk from their customers when unexpected changes in a customer’s 
wealth altered his or her ability/willingness to meet contractual obligations.  If a customer 
were unable or unwilling to settle his or her account, the broker bought in and sold out 
the securities in question.  If the margin were insufficient, the broker absorbed the loss. 
However, brokers were also exposed to default risk from their peers.  This counterparty 
risk arose in the process of settlement.  If the defaults of a broker’s clients were severe, 
                                                 
3 See Hautcoeur-Riva (2007) for the evolution of the Paris Bourse over the nineteenth century.  
4The forward market was estimated to be fifty times the size of the cash market See Vincens (1834) Vol. I, 
p. 614. 
  5he might be unable to meet his obligations on settlement day.  His default could produce 
losses for other brokers and a general crisis for the exchange.   
  The rapid operation of the Bourse required confidence that contracts would be 
completed, and the brokers needed to find a solution to manage counterparty risk, a 
critical problem for all derivatives markets.  Edwards (1984) found that the contemporary 
markets use a mix of expulsion, monitoring, margin, price limits, and position and capital 
requirements, employing both rules and discretion to manage this risk.  However, the 
integrity of the exchanges is protected by a mutual guarantee fund.  This mutualization of 
counterparty risk through the exchange ensures market liquidity, while the exchanges 
adopt rules to manage the resulting problem of moral hazard.  This institutional 
arrangement should be able to protect clients and brokers from idiosyncratic shocks.  But, 
Bernanke (1990) and Kroszner (1999, 2006) even have argued that these mutual 
guarantee funds provide an adequate safety net against systemic shocks because there is 
no record of an American exchange failing.  Examining the longer history of the Bourse, 
it is difficult to be so sanguine, as the exchange was bailed out more than once by the 
Banque de France, most dramatically in 1882 (White, 2007). 
The Bourse first mutualized counterparty risk after a crisis erupted in 1818.  It 
established a permanent Common Fund (fonds commun) in 1822 to provide credit to 
defaulting brokers and thereby maintain an orderly operation of the market.  Most 
revenue for the common fund was raised by a stamp tax imposed on the special paper 
used by brokers to record their operations.  Additional income was derived from 
brokerage fees for the trades conducted on behalf of the government, and interest from 
the Fund’s investments in reports. The Compagnie set its expected revenue higher than 
its expenses, typically producing a large surplus.  However, only a portion of the surplus 
was usually transferred to the Common Fund; the remainder was rebated to the members.  
The surplus may be considered as a refundable ex ante assessment against potential 
losses with the assessment being set in rough proportion to each broker’s volume and 
consequently his exposure to risk.
5 
 
                                                 
5The rebate to members was equally distributed, producing a substantial redistribution and subsidy to 
weaker members with a potential for increasing moral hazard. 
  6A Taxonomy of Defaults 
 
Defining when a broker failed is not a simple task, and the management of broker 
failures evolved over the course of the nineteenth century.  There were changes in 
bankruptcy law (le droit de faillites) and jurisprudence regulating the Compagnie des 
Agents de Change (the stockbrokers association), forward contracts, and the partnerships 
formed to exploit the brokers’ offices.
 6  Furthermore, the Chambre slowly increased its 
considerable authority to regulate and monitor the brokers; and the Minister of Finance 
and the Prosecutor-General (Procureur de la République) sometimes intervened directly. 
Complicating matters was the legal status of the different transactions executed by the 
brokers.  The brokers’ monopoly covered some (the faits de charge) but not all of their 
operations.  These monopoly-controlled transactions were not fixed and changed over the 
course of the nineteenth century. The law obliged brokers to complete their faits de 
charges. A default, the failure to complete them, was considered to be a banqueroute, 
which was potentially punishable with a term of forced labor.
7  It is thus not surprising 
that some apprehensive brokers took flight or committed suicide when faced with these 
penalties.   
Because of this evolving institutional framework, we must carefully define the 
reasons for a brokers’ untimely exit from the Bourse; and we identify several periods, 
representing significant changes in the regulatory regime.  But first, we must provide a 
taxonomy of failure.  We use the term default (défaillance) to indicate all cases in which 
a broker found himself in a situation where he could not complete his transactions with 
either his fellow brokers or his customers.  Less commonly, a broker might fail if a 
customer demanded the return of funds or securities that had been deposited with the 
broker and he was unable to comply. We classify brokers’ defaults into three categories 
reflecting the increasing severity of the problems faced by a broker: (1) a liquidity 
problem, (2) a forced resignation, and (3) a suspension of payment. 
                                                 
6 See Hautcoeur and Levratto (2010) and Lagneau and Riva (2010) for a more detailed discussion. 
7 A banqueroute does not have the same meaning as bankruptcy in English, which is the equivalent of the a 
faillite, the legal procedure where a broker would have been declared to be bankrupt and processed through 
the courts.  A banqueroute occurred when an individual was accused of incompetence. When the 
bankruptcy involved fraud or a violation of the law, it was a banqueroute frauduleuse, which was 
punishable by imprisonment for life with forced labor.  
  7We define a liquidity problem for a broker as occurring when the Chambre 
Syndicale decided to offer him assistance with a prospective default.  If a broker quickly 
revealed his situation to the Chambre (usually in advance of the settlement day) and had 
not violated the Bourse’s rules or taken excessive risk, the Chambre might provide an 
advance from the Common Fund.  This assistance was intended to enable the broker to 
continue his operations and avoid a default.  These loans carried interest and were usually 
collateralized by the broker’s security bond and other assets.  However, this assistance 
brought with it oversight and supervision by the Chambre, controlling and often placing 
limits upon the activities of the broker until the loan was repaid and the broker met of all 
his obligations. In this case, a broker’s difficulties were typically not revealed to the 
public and his fellow brokers. Some of the brokers who experienced a liquidity crisis 
survived while others never recovered and later failed.   
A default would result in a forced resignation (démission forcée) or “internal 
insolvency” when the Chambre decided that the broker must cease operation and leave 
the Compagnie.  In exchange for departing, the Chambre covered the broker’s position 
and demanded a letter of resignation.  In addition to the letter, the broker usually 
transferred to the Chambre most of his personal wealth, as the broker had unlimited 
liability, with the remaining losses being absorbed by the Common Fund.
8 A forced 
resignation reflected the fact that the Chambre considered the broker to have transgressed 
his legal or corporate obligations.  The broker may also have aggravated the situation and 
threatened the position of his fellow brokers by attempting to conceal his problems from 
the Chambre.  Although the Common Fund made the brokers’ creditors whole, the broker 
and his family were often considered morally if not legally obliged to fully reimburse the 
fund.
9  
The most extreme outcome for a default was a suspension of payments or 
“external insolvency.”  In this case, when a broker defaulted, the Chambre refused to 
intervene and bail him out with the Common Fund.  This event would result in a formal 
legal dissolution or a private negotiated settlement with the brokers’ creditors.  The last 
was usually the preferred outcome by all parties because of the substantial risks and costs 
                                                 
8 The Chambre attempted to adjust this levy in accordance with the gravity of broker’s transgressions. 
9 For example, depending on the details of the marriage contract, a wife’s dowry would be 
considered as a part of a broker’s wealth, and sometimes sons covered the debts of their fathers. 
  8of the legal system. While a broker had unlimited liability that would absorb his security 
bond, capital and personal wealth, his partners’ position was less certain.  Until the 
Commercial Code was modified in 1862 to establish limited liability for the partners, 
judges had discretion whether to impose limited or unlimited liability on partners.
10  
Consequently, a defaulting broker’s partner might wish to avoid the courts in the event of 
a forced resignation.  Similarly, the brokers who were creditors of a defaulting broker 
preferred a private settlement because it was the only means for them to recover their 
assets as jurisprudence had determined that they did not have access to the courts.  Lastly, 
the Chambre feared that a court case might result in an undesirable new precedent and 
draw the attention of Minister of Finance who might impose new regulations or lead the 
public to demand an end to their monopoly.   
Figure 1 classifies all defaulting brokers that we found in the minutes of the 
Chambre Syndicale and the General Assembly from 1815 to 1913 and each of the five 
major regimes that we identified and are discussed in the next section.  The high number 
of defaulting brokers in the early years and the clustering of defaults during financial 













                                                 
10 Loi de 2 Juillet 1862, Article 75, Code de Commerce.  Before 1862, judges often were hostile 
to partnerships because they considered it a breach of the brokers’ legal position as officiers 
ministériels. They could declare a partnership null and void; and if a partner had not fully paid in 
his share of the capital, he could refuse to contribute it upon the failure of the broker. 
  9 
 
Figure 1 































Source: Chambre syndicale de la compagnie des agents de change, Séances and Comptes Rendus Annuels 
and the Compagnie des agents de change, Assemblée Générales, Rapports. 
ComNote: See the test for the definitions of the different types of broker defaults and the characteristics of 
the regulatory regime. 
 
  10The Evolving Management of Failure and Risk 
  
Over the course of the nineteenth century, the management of client and 
counterparty risk evolved significantly.  To correctly assess the determinants of brokers’ 
failures, we need to identify the major regulatory regimes.  In our historical narrative, we 
consider the liability features of each regime and how they affected the likelihood of a 
default: (1) the liability of clients vis-à-vis their brokers to complete their contracts, (2) 
the liability of the brokers vis-à-vis their clients to complete their transactions, (3) the 
liability of partners vis-à-vis the partnership, (4) the liability of counterparty brokers vis-
à-vis brokers and their clients, and (5) the liability of the Compagnie as a whole, that is 
the “solidarity” or mutualization of risk.  Three additional factors were also important: (6) 
the selection criteria for members. (7) the Common Fund’s size, pay out rules and its 
monitoring and discipline of members, and (8) the willingness of the Banque de France 
and the French Treasury to act as a lenders of last resort. 
I. 1801-1822 
The first regime began with the re-founding of the Bourse in 1801.  Before 1805, 
forward contracts were not legal.  The courts changed their interpretation in this year, 
giving legal status to almost all types of forward contracts, a position they would retain 
until 1823. In these first two decades, there was no mutualization of risk; and each broker 
was essentially at the mercy of his creditors and the courts. For the clients, the first line of 
protection from a defaulting broker was his security bond.  Initially this was set in 1801 
at 60,000 francs, then raised in 1806 to 100,000 francs.  It was capped at a maximum of 
125,000 francs in 1816, at which it became fixed in 1818 (White, 2007). While a broker 
had unlimited liability, the liabilities of his partners were legally uncertain. The Ministry 
of Finance and the Chambre tried to contain counterparty risk by enforcing an 
interpretation of the Code de Commerce’s Article 86 whereby a broker could avoid 
liability to his customer if his counterparty defaulted by delivering to the name of the 
counterparty to the customer so that the client became the creditor of counterparty broker.  
  11Nevertheless, it was common for brokers to give their personal guarantee to customers, as 
they competed with other brokers on and off the exchange.
11    
In spite of these seemingly strong controls, there were a surprisingly large number 
of failures under this first regulatory regime.  For the years 1801-1814, when there is no 
detailed data in the archives of the Bourse, the Compagnie reported that 46 out of a total 
of 115 brokers lost their offices under less than honorable circumstances.  Eighteen were 
officially bankrupt (faillite), 12 had large losses and negotiated a settlement with their 
creditors, 12 were removed by the government because they had broken the law, and 4 
were driven to suicide by the disastrous state of their affairs.
12  Between 1815 and 1817, 
there were two defaults.  
The crisis of 1818 was a turning point, forcing the Bourse to consider the 
mutualization of risk.  The crisis originated in the problem of managing the payment of 
reparations to victorious Allies after Waterloo.  Totalling 1.8 billion francs, 1.5 billion 
francs were raised sale of rentes, perpetual bonds (White, 2001). During the final 
negotiations of the peace settlement, the Banque de France bolstered the demand for the 
rentes by offering discounts of 100 million francs.  As the money supply expanded and 
its gold reserves declined precipitously, the Banque tightened credit in September 1818; 
the price of the rentes tumbled and investors defaulted on their forward contracts. The 
Chambre was worried that some brokers would be unable to complete the October end-
of-month settlement and obtained a 5 million franc loan from the Banque de France.  The 
Compagnie also secured the government’s approval to manipulate the clearing price to 
ensure that the end-of-month settlement was completed. 
But, on the eve of the settlement, the broker Aimé-Jean-Louis Sahut announced 
that he was insolvent and would default.  In the absence of a formal structure to handle 
this event, the Chambre arranged for a bailout of Sahut, although it was a “measure 
contrary to the fundamental principles of our institution.” Sahut raised 770,908 francs of 
the 1,454,980 francs that he needed to settle and each of the remaining brokers 
                                                 
11 After the crisis and scandals of 1823-1824, the authorities interpretation of the law shifted to allow the 
brokers to shoulder the liability. 
12 Mémoire sur la Compagnie des Agents de Change, présenté par le Comité au directeur general du 
Commerce, Procès-verbaux, Chambre sydicale, June 20, 1814. 
  12contributed 12,000 francs for a total of 684,000 francs.
13  But at the next settlement date, 
he required more funds and two more brokers emerged as insolvent.  The remaining 58 
brokers raised 1.1 million francs, but the Chambre was forced to seek a 2.4 million franc 
loan from the Minister of Finance. The brokers rejected joint liability for this credit that 
was originally demanded by the Minister and instead each one accepted individual 
liability for 41,380 francs.  Although the brokers had eschewed joint liability, they repaid 
the internal loan in 1822 by creating a temporary Common Fund in 1819 to collect a 
stamp tax on the paper that they used to record their transactions.   
In the midst of this crisis, the Chambre Syndicale gained the full legal authority it 
had been granted by an Ordonnance in 1816.  This event was triggered by the nomination 
of the sixtieth and final broker to his office.  The Chambre legal position vis-à-vis 
individual brokers was now strengthened considerably.  
II. 1823-1831 
After more failures in 1821-1822 provoked a political storm, the Compagnie 
created a permanent Common Fund of 3 million francs in 1822 in response to the 
government’s threat to compel them to do so by legislation.  This permanent fund began 
operation on July 16, 1822.  Revenues were raised from the stamp taxes until the 
Common Fund reached 3 million francs, the equivalent of 50,000 per broker.   
In addition, the Minister of Finance compelled the Chambre to resign, and the 
courts reapportioned the liability for forward contracts.  The civil courts determined that 
brokers could not enforce payment of forward contracts because they were “gambling 
debts” (Article 1965, Civil Code).  Although the commercial courts (tribuneaux de 
commerce) usually continued to enforce forward contacts, the courts denied brokers’ 
access to the courts as creditors to defaulting counterparty brokers. In general, the refusal 
of the commercial courts to recognize the broker-creditors created an incentive for them 
to avoid the courts and settle with the Chambre serving as a mediator.
14 
Yet, the brokers resisted using the Common Fund to guarantee the solvency of 
their fellow brokers and reserved it for a general liquidity crisis.  The General Assembly 
                                                 
13 Assemblée Générales, Séances (December 4, 1818). 
14 Typically, when a broker defaulted, the broker-creditors would nominate one or more of their number to 
negotiate with the defaulter and/or client-creditors’ legal representatives, with the Chambre protecting the 
general interest of the Compagnie in its role as mediator. The Chambre often pressured the broker-creditors 
to relinquish part of their claims to avoid the case moving to court. 
  13would give permission for use of the fund only if 55 out of the 60 brokers voted to 
approve.  Typically, when a broker failed, the Compagnie refused any credits from the 
Common Fund and opened a voluntary subscription to assist him.  Nevertheless, the 
Chambre made efforts to limit risk-taking.  Common accounting rules were set to 
facilitate monitoring and the management of defaults.  The Chambre was given the power 
to compel brokers to deposit money or securities with the Common Fund if it was 
determined that they were taking an excessively large position in the market.  However, 
this control was abandoned after the courts determined that these deposits could not be 
used to protect counterparty brokers but would be used to compensate other creditors.  
Capital requirements on new brokers were imposed, setting a minimum level of 
wealth. The additional funds needed to operate the business made a partnership almost a 
necessity.
15 Partnership agreements (actes de sociétés) were regulated and subject to 
approval of the Chambre.  The defaults of 1821 and 1822 caused numerous problems 
between brokers and their partners, leading the Chambre to increase its monitoring of the 
partnerships. While the brokers had unlimited liability, their partners were officially 
limited in liability to their paid-in capital.  Wanting to provide greater protection, the 
Chambre tried to ensure that partners would be “honorable” persons who would pay all 
the debts of defaulting brokers.  In addition to capital requirements, there were disclosure 
rules for monitoring, requiring brokers to report income, expenses and position from their 
trading activity.  From the later 1840s onward, these took the form of twice yearly reports 
to the Common Fund.     
III. 1832-1882 
The Revolution of 1830 was accompanied by a financial crisis.  In the tumultuous 
years 1830-1831, nineteen brokers defaulted, one of whom was bankrupt and 13 of whom 
were forced to resign. Faced with this crisis and the need to establish credibility with the 
new political regime, the Compagnie employed the Common Fund, but its 3 million 
francs were soon exhausted. Having poorly responded to the crisis, the General Assembly 
delegated more discretion to the Chambre to manage a broker’s default.
16  Henceforth, 
                                                 
15 The brokers were officially officers of the state (officiers-ministeriels), and only they legally 
owned the office and could carry out its functions on the Bourse. 
16 Discretion enabled the Chambre Syndicale to act more quickly discretely.   If action required a vote of 
the General Assembly, the procedure would take time and any problem would immediately become public. 
  14the Chambre could provide an advance to a defaulting broker equal to the value of his 
security bond plus a maximum of 100,000 francs collateralized by his office.  Beyond 
this, the Chambre syndicale could request authority from the General Assembly to use of 
the Common Fund, if two-thirds of the General Assembly approved.  
Concerned about the division of liability between a broker and his partners, the 
Chambre required that all new partnerships take a standard, legally sanctioned-form as 
sociétés en commandite.
17 This change enhanced the capacity of the exchange to manage 
counterparty risk because it improved both the guarantee provided by each agent and the 
likelihood that loans granted by the Common Fund would be repaid as they were made 
not to just the brokers but to the partnership, which now had legal standing and had to 
approve of any loans.  Nevertheless, forward contracts had no legal status, in spite of 
efforts by the Compagnie to persuade the courts. The potentially easy default by 
customers left brokers facing an uncertain liability.
18  Although they tempered clients’ 
losses, the changes after 1830 do not appear to have diminished the number or frequency 
of failures on the exchange, as seen in Figure 1. 
In this period’s crises, the Common Fund appears to have been insufficient, and 
the Banque de France provided regular credits to the Bourse.  Yet, this action by the 
lender of last resort may have induced morally hazardous behavior by the brokers.  The 
first severe crisis, where ten brokers defaulted, would have exhausted the Common Fund; 
a collapse was averted by the Banque’s loan in October 1840 of 25 million francs.  The 
Revolution of 1848 produced perhaps the largest drop in the stock market in the 
nineteenth century, accompanied by falling prices for corporate and government bonds; 
yet no broker defaults were recorded.  These were avoided because the Bourse closed 
between February 23 and March 6, the end-of-month settlement was managed by a 
manipulation of the clearing price, and a settlement was forced on all outstanding forward 
contracts regardless of their term.  Yet, when the Chambre received a loan of 2.4 million 
francs from the Banque, it resisted the idea of mutualized liability and discounted bonds 
                                                 
17 These partnerships were recorded with the Tribunal de Commerce, in accordance with Article 42 of the 
Code de Commerce.  
18 Report of Chamber of Commerce of Paris on the application of the art. 1965 Civil Code to forward 
contracts, 1877.  
  15with the Banque de France not in its own name but on behalf of the brokers needing 
assistance.
  
This extraordinary action helped to avoid brokers’ defaults, but it obviously did 
not solve the underlying political crisis.  When the exchange reopened, security prices 
continued to tumble.  As its reserves fell, the Banque de France suspended convertibility 
of its banknotes on March 15.  At the same time, the Treasury decreed a six month 
extension in the maturity of its floating debt.  Fearful that banks would not provide credit 
for investors in the forward market to carry over their positions, the Compagnie asked the 
Banque de France for a loan to help complete settlement.  However, the loan was not 
used as news of the loan calmed the bankers.  After this experience, the Banque became 
apprehensive of its effect on the Bourse.  When the syndic approached the Banque for a 2 
million franc discount on December 22, 1852 to prevent a crisis at the upcoming 
settlement, the Conseil Général of the Banque granted the loan but questioned whether 
frequent loans were engendering moral hazard.
19 The Banque ensured that the collateral 
was endorsed by the members of the Chambre in their role as administrators not 
individual brokers, signaling a shift towards the mutualization of risk. Coupled with 
rising volume on the exchange and signs of resistance from the Banque, the Compagnie 
raised the Common Fund from 3 million to 4.5 million in 1852 and 6 million francs in 
1854.  After the crisis of 1866-1867 when ten brokers defaulted, the General Assembly 
increased the discretionary lending authority of the Chambre to 450,000 francs—the 
equivalent of a broker’s 250,000 franc security bond, his 100,000 franc contribution to 
the Common Fund, and 100,000 francs collateralized by his office, but otherwise it did 
not change the management of risk that had been in place before 1830. 
IV. 1883-1898 
The stock market crash of 1882 was a watershed for the Bourse.  After a 
prolonged boom, equities prices plummeted in January of 1882 in the wake of the 
collapse of the investment bank, the Société de l’Union Générale. Not only was the 
Common Fund wiped out by the need to cover the defaults of imperiled brokers, but the 
Banque de France had to provide a huge loan, acting as “insurer of last resort,” to 
guarantee the liquidity of the Bourse.  Although the brokers’ were not directly held 
                                                 
19Procès-verbal of the Conseil général of the Banque de France December 22, 1852, p. 342-3.  
  16responsible for the boom and bust, they may have taken on additional risk.   The volume 
of trades increased rapidly while the Common Fund did not, and these problems may 
have been amplified by the leveraging of speculation in the forward market by the 
reports, partly facilitated by the brokers.  Many customers and brokers were not able or 
willing to honor their commitments, upsetting an orderly end-of-month settlement.  The 
Compagnie estimated that 140 million francs were needed to complete the settlement, yet 
it only had 60 million francs available.  
To head off the crisis, the General Assembly quickly assumed mutual 
responsibility for the January and February settlements and gave the syndic authority to 
contract an 80 million franc loan from the Banque, intermediated by a syndicate of banks. 
After the liquidity crisis subsided, all but 30 million francs were repaid; and eight of the 
brokers remained in debt—six of whom were forced to resign.  To cover the remaining 
debt, the brokers each raised 300,000 francs for 18 million.  Adding the 8.7 million in the 
Common Fund plus incoming revenues covered the balance.   It took until 1889 for the 
revenues of the Common Fund to repay this internal loan and recapitalize the Common 
fund at 9.5 million francs (White, 2007).   
  Legislation giving legal status to forward contracts had been stalled for decades, 
but as a result of the crash they became enforceable with the passage of the Law of June 
28, 1885.
20  Now brokers could legally pursue defaulting customers on the forward 
market, but this implied that forward contracts were now part of the faits de charge with 
severe penalties for default.  This exposure was limited quickly by the Cour de Cassation 
to officially listed securities. Moreover, the crisis changed the Compagnie’s policy vis-à-
vis clients’ losses from a defaulting broker. Before 1882 the Compagnie generously 
repaid clients, thereby attracting business.  Now it forced institutional investors to absorb 
the losses, reducing its comparative edge vis-à-vis the Coulisse until it restored its 
previous position in 1895.
21 In 1890, the brokers gained addition protection when they 
were allowed to proceed against defaulting customers and were given the legal right to 
demand margin.  In exchange for these protections, new legislation in 1890 imposed new 
constraints, including explicit liability on a broker to complete a client’s transaction if his 
                                                 
20 According to estimates of the Chambre Syndicale, the courts did not enforce forward contracts valued at 
117 million francs in the aftermath of the crisis. 
21 It is the case for the Vuaflard’s and Bex’s defaults, respectively in 1886 and 1888.  
  17counterparty failed. Combined with the lowered levels of activity on the market, these 
controls on risk seem to have limited failures, as seen in Figure 1. 
V. 1899-1913 
No widespread crisis afflicted the Bourse in the last fifteen years before the First 
World War.  The Common Fund was fully replenished by 1889 and was maintained at a 
relatively high ratio relative to volume in the years before World War I.  There was thus 
an ample cushion for the failures that did occur; but having accepted a mutualization of 
the risk, the Compagnie exerted considerable efforts to limit risk-taking from the moral 
hazard.  New brokers were more carefully screened; and the Chambre Syndicale sought 
to ensure that only brokers from wealthy, “grand bourgeois” families could acquire an 
office.   Higher wealth meant that the brokers had more capital to cover losses from 
defaults, but the agents de change also appear to have come from a more homogeneous 
social group, perhaps ensuring that there they could monitor one another more closely 
and exercise greater moral suasion (Verley, 2007).   
After trades off the Bourse were fully legalized in 1893 a boom began in South 
African gold mining stocks, focused on the Coulisse.  When this market crashed in 
October 1895, many brokers on the Coulisse failed.
22  The Bourse’s monopoly was 
reinforced by Government, which again made trading in listed securities off the exchange 
illegal.   In return, the Bourse agreed to increase its capacity by raising the number of 
agents from 60 to 70 and the maximum number of clerks per broker from four to six.  In 
addition, the exchange reinforced its own rules and monitoring.  It accepted the 
government’s demand for the imposition of “solidarity” or joint liability of the brokers 
for all trades in listed securities, which became law on April 13, 1898.  As the 
government clamped down on the Coulisse and the Chambre Syndicale sought to limit 
risk-taking, trading in riskier securities migrated to the Marché Libre, the unregulated 
“third” or “free market.” 
   
 
 
                                                 
22 During this crisis, to prevent any spillover risk from brokers on the Coulisse, the Chambre 
limited relationships between its agents de change and these coulissiers. 
  18Why Brokers Failed 
 
  To explain why brokers failed, we first examined the number of annual defaults.  
For these time series regressions, the dependent variable is the number of defaults per 
year, measured by the number of brokers who suspended payments or were forced to 
resign.  By excluding the brokers who had liquidity problems, it identifies the brokers 
who the Chambre believed were clearly insolvent and did not merit a loan. 
 
Figure 2 




































Defaulting Brokers Return on Equities  
 
Major changes in equity or bond prices would have induced brokers’ clients to 
default, and there are several indices for the Paris market in the nineteenth century.  For 
the whole of the nineteenth century, Arbulu (1998) constructed the broadest measure for 
equities, an index of equities listed on the Bourse, weighted by sector. Using this index, 
we calculated yearly returns (EQUITIES). We show these returns with the number of 
defaulting brokers in Figure 2, where some but not all large negative returns correspond 
  19to a high number of defaulting brokers.  The most notable exception is 1848 when, as 
previously described, the Bourse intervened to redistribute the losses. 
To take into account the effect of the bond market on defaults, we use the annual 
return on the French government’s perpetuals, the rentes (RENTES). At the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, French government securities dominated the market; by mid-
century there were large issues of foreign and domestic corporate bonds and finally 
equities.  While speculation had centered on the rentes early in the century, they became 
the safest long-term security.  Thus, in a crisis there might be a flight to quality; a major 
reversal in their role.  Figure 3 reports the number of defaults and the price of the rentes.   








































  20  Clients’ propensity to default would also have been sensitive to the rate at which 
they could borrow for their report.  Unfortunately, we only have a measure of the interest 
rate on the reports for the years 1875-1914 (Flandreau and Sicsic, 2003).  Instead, we use 
another short-term market, the open rate of interest (Arbulu, 2007), which is available for 
the whole century.  It is shown in Figure 4 with brokers’ defaults.  Obviously, this 
variable (INTRATE) does not capture the risk premium embedded in the interest rate on 
the report.  However, the open rate did move sharply during financial crises.   
 
Figure 4 







































Brokers were also exposed to shifts in income from the volume of trading that 
moved sharply with booms and crashes.  There is no volume index for the Bourse, but 
there is the revenue from the stamp taxes (timbres), which were levied to fund the 
  21Common Fund from 1819 to 1913.
23  This measure is used as a proxy for volume on the 
exchange and the percentage change in annual volume (VOLUME) is used as a 
contributing factor.   The yearly innovation in volume is graphed in Figure 5, where large 
declines in some years correlate with numerous defaults.   
 
    Figure 5 












































Defaulting Brokers Change in Volume  
 
Brokers could control risk by increasing their capital.  Unfortunately we do not 
have a measure of individual brokers’ capital that they and their partners raised.  The only 
proxy we have is the price of the office that reflects not the capital but the value of the 
seat.  Furthermore, for much of the period, the Chambre regulated the price of the seat.  
Until 1898, there were only 60 seats and prices for the offices changed infrequently.  As a 
rough proxy to measure the risk to which a broker would be exposed we use the ratio of a 
seat price to our measure of volume (SP/VOLUME).  Figure 6 displays this variable and 
the number of defaulting brokers.  If this ratio falls, it would imply that brokers are more 
exposed to risk as volume is increasing relative to capital. 
                                                 
23 Rapports annuels de la Commission de Comptabilité de la Caisse Commune à l’Assembleé 
générale de la Compagnie des agents de change. 
  22         Figure 6 



























Number of Defaulting Brokers Ratio of Seat Price to Stamp Taxes
 
 
Moral hazard might also have contributed to the default of a broker if risk taking 
was not adequately controlled by the Chambre.  Although the Chambre’s efforts to limit 
risk-taking are hard to measure, the size of the Common Fund was regularly reported.  
Failing to keep the fund proportionate to volume may be considered as one sign that the 
Bourse was ignoring the growth of risk.  The size of the fund relative to volume, as 
measured by stamp taxes (CF/VOLUME) is then a proxy for this problem.  If volume 
rose and the fund did not rise, this would be an indication of increased risk/risk-taking. 
Figure 7 graphs this ratio and the number of defaulting brokers.  Large declines in the 
ratio are associated with increases in defaults.  While the fund frequently did not keep up 
with volume increases in the first three quarters of the century, it appears that in the 
aftermath of the crash of 1882, there was a major change and the fund was adjusted as 
volume rose. 
 
  23    Figure 7 

























Number of Defaulting Brokers Ratio of Common Fund to Stamp Taxes  
  
Our model in equation 1 posits that the annual number of brokers’ defaults were a 
function of the variables discussed above and the regulatory regimes, whose effects are 
measured by a series of dummy variables Dit, with the first regime, 1801-1822 being the 
omitted regime.  We usual annual data from 1819 to 1913, picking our starting point as it 
was the opening year of the Common Fund. 
 
(1)  DEFAULTSt =  β0  + β1EQUITIESt + β2RENTESt +  β3INTRATEt  + β4VOLUMEt  +          
β5SP/VOLUMEt  +  β6CP/VOLUMEt + β7D1823-1830 + β8D1831-1882+  β9D1883-
1897+ β10 D1898-1913+  et 
 
The variables measured as percentage changes were all stationary.  Using 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests we rejected the hypothesis that there were unit roots in 
the time series.  However the SP/VOLUME and CF/VOLUME variables required first 
differencing to achieve stationarity.     
  24  The number of defaulting brokers that we seek to explain is count data.  For this 
type of regression, a Poisson distribution assumes that the (conditional) mean is equal to 
the (conditional) variance (Cameron and Trivedi,1998).  In our annual data, the mean 
number of broker failures per year for 1815-1913 is 0.88 while the variance is 2.61, 
showing evidence of overdispersion.  In this case a negative binominal regression is 
typically used as it has a Poisson model nested within it.  The results are reported in 
Table 1, where the likelihood ratio tests for the parameter α rejects the Poisson 
distribution. 
  Although they are not significant at conventional levels, the negative sign on 
returns for equities and the rentes suggest that falling asset prices increased the number of 
broker failures.
24  An increase in the interest rate signaled a decline in broker failures 
perhaps because it increased the cost of speculating.  Higher volume, which would have 
buoyed broker’s incomes, also reduced the number of defaults.  The capital relative to 
volume is a relatively weak variable, although it has the correct sign, probably because it 
is a poor measure of capital for brokers.  However, broker defaults were quite sensitive to 
the size of the Common Fund relative to volume.  Increases in the fund relative to volume 
lowered defaults.   The dummy variables for the several regulatory regimes tell a story 
that is consistent with our narrative.  In the first years of the Common Fund, there was 
little effort to control broker risk.  It appears that after the crisis of 1830-1831 and the 
change in regulations, there was a modest reduction in broker failures.  However it was 
not until after the crash of 1882 that the Bourse imposed rules that reduced risk-taking 
and forward contracts were legalized.  The post-1898 regime appears to have had even a 






                                                 
24 The correlation (0.642) between the returns to the equities index and the rentes is fairly high.  Given the 
relatively modest time span of the data and the potential for multicollinearity, regressions with both 
variables and these variables separately are reported. 
 
  25Table 1 
Broker Defaults, 1819-1913 




































































  R-2  0.120 0.119 0.118 






Prob>χ2 = 0.00 
.981 
(0.464) 
Prob>χ2 = 0.00 
.981 
(0.471) 
Prob>χ2 = 0.00 
 
The standard errors are reported in parentheses, where + indicates significance at the 10 
percent level, * significance at the 5 percent level, and **significance at the one percent 
level  
 
Figure 8 displays the actual broker failures and the failures predicted by the 
negative binominal model.  The model explains much of the variation in the observed 
broker defaults, picking up most of the crises in spite of the limitations of the data.   
Perhaps, the most prominent exceptions are in 1895, 1896 and 1904.  Some of these 
defaults, especially those in 1895 and 1896 were the consequence of brokers from the 
  26Bourse becoming involved in the Coulisse after regulations were tightened by the 
Compagnie.  The controls imposed after the crash of 1882 appear thus to have controlled 
the moral hazard from the mutual guarantee of the Common Fund.    
Figure 8 




















Actual Failures Predicted Failures
  
 
  Naturally, the time series data only capture some of the determinants of why 
brokers failed.  To more carefully identify the causes of default we have collected data on 
all brokers between 1815 and 1913.  The names of the 526 brokers for the 60 and later 70 
offices they held, the date of their nomination to the office, and the date of their official 
departure, as well as the names of the syndics, were obtained from the Compagnie’s 
Filiation des charges (1961). Which brokers defaulted and the circumstances of the 
default were found in the minutes of the Chambre Syndicale and the General Assembly.  
We were also better able to pinpoint the date of default, which often differed from the 
official date of departure from office.  Using this information we were able to compute 
the time a broker was in office, or duration, measured in days (DURATION).  The 
minutes revealed that brokers who took over the office of a defaulting broker faced 
considerably difficulties. Apparently, there were continuing problems with the book of 
  27the broker that were not resolved upon his dismissal.  It was widely believed that these 
offices became charges maudites or “cursed seats” as they raised the probability of the 
next broker failing.  To test for this problem we included a dummy variable 
(PREDECESSOR) for the preceding broker failing.   We use the same series of dummy 
variables for the regulatory regimes, previously described, both for the time when a 
broker took office and the time when he departed.  Similarly we employ the variables 
used in the time series on equity and bond prices, the proxy variable for volume, interest 
rates, seat prices, and the Common Fund for the beginning and end of a broker’s time in 
office, depending whether we are used the hazard model or logit model described below. 
We include a dummy variable if the broker was a syndic—the chief officer—of the 
Compagnie (SYNDIC).  Although only one syndic failed, we presume that being a syndic 
should reduce the probability of default as more trustworthy, sound brokers would be 
elected to this position.   
We first estimate the determinants of the ith broker’s duration in office using a 
proportional hazard model with equation 2 and secondly the causes of his default using a 
logit regression with equation 3.   
 
(2)  DURATIONi =  β0  + β1EQUITIESt + β2RENTESt +  β3INTRATEt  + β4VOLUMEt  
+ β5SP/VOLUMEt  + β6CP/VOLUMEt + β7D1823-1830 + β8D1831-1882+ β9D1883-
1897+ β10 D1898-1913+ β11SYNDICi + β12PREDECESSORi + et 
 
(3)  DEFAULTi  =  β0  + β1EQUITIESt + β2RENTESt +  β3INTRATEt  + β4VOLUMEt  +          
β5SP/VOLUMEt  +  β6CP/VOLUMEt + β7D1823-1830 + β8D1831-1882+  β9D1883-
1897+ β10 D1898-1913+ β11SYNDICi + β12PREDECESSORi + β12DURATIONi +  et 
 
By using the hazard model we can examine what effect the initial conditions had 
on the length of time that a broker would stay in his office (Kiefer, 1988).  For the hazard 
model, a default represents “censoring,” that is an abnormal termination of the time in 
office.   In our analysis we must restrict ourselves to the years 1819 and later as that is the 
first year when there is information on the stamp taxes that we use to estimate volume. In 
contrast, the logit focuses on the conditions that prevailed in the year leading up to the 
  28closure of the broker’s office.  For our logit and proportional hazard models, a default is 
assigned a value of one; otherwise if the broker simply exited from the Bourse, he is 
assigned a value of zero.    An issue arises for the logit regressions because some 61 of 
the 526 brokers continued in office well past 1913.  Our study terminates in 1913 because 
conditions changed drastically during World War I.  We have treated this issue in two 
ways.  First, we exclude those brokers who continued their operations past 1913 and 
secondly, we include them, using the data for 1913.  These two approaches yielded 
similar results and we report only the results when all brokers are included.     
For the proportional hazard model we assumed a Weibull distribution, as this 
specification is appropriate for data that contain observations with both short and long 
durations.   It also permits us to test for duration dependence, that is, whether there was 
any increased likelihood of survival over time.  The results for the proportional hazard 
model are presented in Table 2.  As might be expected most of the variables at the 
outset—the growth of volume, and the changes in the interest rate, seat price to volume, 
and Common Fund to volume—have little effect on how long the broker will survive.  
However, positive equity and rentes returns seem to have given a broker a modest fillip, 
as the coefficient on the hazard ratio is significantly less than one, indicating a lower 
hazard and longer survival time.  While becoming the syndic did not affect survival time, 
taking over an office from a defaulting broker was disastrous.   The coefficient on the 












  29Table 2 
Individual Broker Defaults, 1819-1913 
Proportional Hazard Model Regressions (Weibull Distribution) 
(Hazard Ratios and Standard Errors) 
 
Variable 












































































 LR Chi-2 (12)  85.41**  83.33**  85.15** 
No. of  Obs.  439  439  439 
 
The standard errors are reported in parentheses, where + indicates significance at the 10 
percent level, * significance at the 5 percent level, and **significance at the one percent 
level  
 
Starting out as a broker before the advent of the Common Fund reduced survival 
time and even the period 1823-1831 caused no significant increase or decrease in survival 
time.  Only after the reforms of the 1830s is there a coefficient significantly smaller than 
one for the period 1832-1882.  Changes in the regulatory regimes for 1883-1898 and 
1899-1913 greatly increased the chances of survival, as indicated by their very small 
  30coefficients.  The estimated coefficient p in the proportional hazard model is significantly 
less than one implying that as more time spent as a broker, the lower likelihood of failure, 
suggesting that experience was an important factor in lowering defaults.   
Table 3 






















































































 Pseudo- -2  0.346  0.342  0.344 
No. of  Obs.  498  498  498 
The standard errors are reported in parentheses, where + indicates significance at the 10 
percent level, * significance at the 5 percent level, and **significance at the one percent 
level  
 
The logit regressions in Table 3 confirm the time series results.   In the year 
before a failure, negative returns on equities and the rentes contributed to broker defaults.  
  31Even more significantly, a decline in our measure of volume increased the probability of 
a broker defaulting.  As in the times series, a rise in the open rate of interest from the 
previous year reduced the likelihood that a broker would default.  If volume rose relative 
to our measures for brokers’ capital and the Common Fund, there was an increased 
probability of brokers defaulting.  If a broker was a syndic of the Compagnie, it does not 
appear to have influenced the likelihood that he would default.   However, the charges 
maudites were clearly a problem.   Experience was an important factor, decreasing the 
likelihood that a broker would fail, as the longer the duration, the less his chance of 
defaulting.   The results for the regime dummies again corroborate those for the hazard 
model and the time series regressions.  Operating under the more restrictive later regimes, 
1883-1898 and 1899-1913 significantly reduced the likelihood broker default. There are 
weaker effects for earlier regimes.   But, it is important to note that duration is strongly 
and positively correlated with the last regime (0.59), and when duration is dropped from 
the regression, the effects of this regime are even stronger.  Obviously, the regulatory 
regime in place at the time strongly influenced the time a broker was in office. 
 
Lessons for Today? 
 
  To lower counterparty risk so that a broker’s failure did not endanger his brethren 
on the Bourse and provoke a more general liquidity crisis required a tight regulatory 
regime. For much of the nineteenth century, brokers resisted strong controls and rules 
that would have disciplined risk-taking.  Consequently, the Common Fund was 
sometimes inadequate for covering the losses experienced by brokers.  To avert a general 
crisis, the Chambre Syndicale was often forced to ask for assistance from the Banque de 
France or even resort to extraordinary measures such as manipulating the clearing price 
in the forward market.  In setting its regulations, the exchange was forced to reckon with 
competition from the Coulisse, as imposing tough risk controls would lower the returns 
for its brokers relative to their largely unregulated rivals on the curb market. With a 
mutual guarantee fund and appropriate monitoring, the benefit from controlling 
counterparty risk was that investors should have been able to trust the brokers on the 
Bourse more than the brokers off the exchange who were not monitored by their peers. 
  32But the tightening regulatory regime and the change in policy vis-à-vis institutional 
investors’ losses after 1882 led business to move off of the exchange.  In the late 1880s, 
the Coulisse grew rapidly, taking on more risk.  When it was felled by a financial crisis 
and multiple broker failures in 1895-1896, the Bourse secured government intervention 
and legislation that reinforced its monopoly and increased control of the curb market.   
Unfortunately, World War I ended this experiment; but the experience of the Paris 
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